

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 060921
ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AF-08 ARA-06
CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-07 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03
NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01
PRS-01 OES-06 SS-15 USIA-06 /126 R

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S/S - MR. SEBASTIAN

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R 182215Z MAR 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 060921

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM, CCD, UK

SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS WITH UK REPRESENTATIVES ON CTB

1. SUMMARY: IN DISCUSSION OF CTB AT MEETING ON DISARMAMENT
ISSUES MARCH 14, BRITISH REPS EMPHASIZED THEIR DESIRE TO BE
INCLUDED IN DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS AS EARLY AND AS FULLY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 060921

AS POSSIBLE. THEIR PRINCIPAL INTERESTS WERE: (1) EFFECTS OF
CTB ON THEIR OWN WEAPONS PROGRAM; (2) EFFECT ON WESTERN
SECURITY; (3) FORM AND TIMING OF A POSSIBLE MORATORIUM ON
TESTING; AND (4) PROBLEM OF DEALING WITH FRENCH AND CHINESE.
UK MOD REPS MADE TECHNICAL AND MILITARY CASE FOR CONTINUING
TESTING BUT RECOGNIZED THAT THESE HAD TO BE BALANCED AGAINST
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS FAVORING A CTB. WE TOOK THEIR

POINT THAT CTB COULD GENERATE CONCERNS IN NATO AND ASSURED THEM THAT SECURITY ASPECTS WOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH ALLIES IN ADVANCE. BRITISH ARGUED AGAINST OPEN-ENDED MORATORIUM BUT SEEMED MORE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TO ONE OF LIMITED DURATION. REGARDING PNES THEY SAID THAT IN VIEW OF NON-PROLIFERATION AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS THEY WOULD STRONGLY PREFER TO SEE PNES BANNED. ON FRENCH PROBLEM THEY CAME DOWN FOR HOLDING DOOR OPEN FOR FRENCH AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. THIS CONSIDERATION ARGUED IN THEIR VIEW AGAINST THROWING CTB ISSUE INTO THE CCD BEFORE FULLY EXPLORING FRENCH VIEWS. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING VISIT OF UK TEAM TO WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, CTB WAS A MAJOR AGENDA ITEM. BRITISH VIEWS WERE CLEARLY BASED ON PREMISE THAT WE WOULD BE MOVING AHEAD ON CTB INITIATIVE UPON COMPLETION OF CURRENT POLICY REVIEW. THEY WANTED TO RECORD THEIR INTEREST IN BEING INCLUDED IN ALL PHASES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AGREEMENT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING.

3. UK MOD REPS EMPHASIZED THEIR RELIANCE ON US EXPERIENCE IN MAINTAINING THEIR STOCKPILE IN A STATE OF READINESS. THEY SAID THEY ALSO HAVE A PROGRAM DESIGNED TO UPGRADE THEIR DETERRENT. TO THIS END UK MINISTERS HAD APPROVED A NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM AT A RATE OF ABOUT ONE EVERY 15 MONTHS. A TEST IS SCHEDULED FOR THE AUTUMN OF 1978 AND THIS HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE PRIME MINISTER. THE BRITISH DEPEND ENTIRELY ON OUR NEVADA TEST FACILITIES. FROM A PURELY MILITARY POINT OF VIEW THE UK MOD WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 060921

TESTING, BUT RECOGNIZES THAT THIS NEED HAS TO BE BALANCED AGAINST POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS FAVORING A CTB.

4. QUESTION OF THE IMPACT OF A CTB ON WESTERN SECURITY WAS RAISED BY BRITISH IN CONTEXT OF MODERNIZATION OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE. THEY THOUGHT THAT IF WE COULD SAY THAT CTB HAD SOME ADVANTAGE TO THE WEST, THAT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO THE NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP (NPG). WF ASSURED THEM THAT WE WOULD DISCUSS IMPACT OF CTB ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES WITH ALLIES BEFORE MOVING TOWARD A CTB AGREEMENT. WE ALSO TOOK NOTE OF THEIR SUGGESTION TO DISCUSS CTB IN THE NPG.

5. BRITISH SAID THAT ANY TESTING MORATORIUM SHOULD BE AGREED AND SHOULD HAVE A CLEARLY DEFINED TERMINATION DATE IN CASE A TREATY WERE NOT ACHIEVED IN THE INTERIM.

6. BRITISH EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT WE NOT PUT UNDUE PRESSURE ON FRANCE; BRITISH WANT TO LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN TO FRENCH ACCESSION AT SOME POINT. AS FOR THE CHINESE, BRITISH REGARD THEM AS PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIETS. WE EMPHASIZED THAT WE SHOULD KEEP IN CONTACT WITH THE FRENCH AND PRC AS WE MOVE AHEAD BUT SHOULD NOT ALLOW THEIR ATTITUDES TO IMPEDE PROGRESS. EVEN THOUGH NEITHER COUNTRY WOULD BE LIKELY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CTB AGREEMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE, CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT IMPEL THEM TO ACCEDE AT A LATER DATE AND WE SHOULD MAKE THIS AS EASY FOR THEM AS POSSIBLE.

7. BRITISH REP WONDERED WHETHER, IN VIEW OF THE FRENCH PROBLEM, CCD WOULD BE THE BEST FORUM FOR NEGOTIATING A CTB, SINCE THE FRENCH WERE NOT PARTICIPANTS. WE STATED THAT IF

FRANCE AND/OR CHINA HAD INTEREST IN PARTICIPATING IN NEGOTIATIONS, WE WOULD BE FLEXIBLE ON QUESTION OF FORUMS, BUT THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH INTEREST, WE CONSIDERED CCD THE APPROPRIATE BODY FOR THE MULTILATERAL STAGE OF CTB NEGOTIATIONS. ONE OF OUR OBJECTIVES IN SUGGESTING EARLY ROLE FOR CCD IS TO GET WIDEST POSSIBLE ACCESSION TO A CTB. IN A LATER DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT EDMONDS OF UK FOREIGN OFFICE SAID THAT UK WAS NOT OPPOSED TO CCD AS NEGOTIATING FORUM. BUT EDMONDS THOUGHT WE SHOULD DEVELOP ON A TRILATERAL BASIS FULLY AGREED PRINCIPLES ON WHICH A CTB WOULD BE BASED BEFORE COMMITTING OURSELVES TO THE CCD, THUS GIVING THE FRENCH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY TO DECIDE TO JOIN IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 060921

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8. PNE PROBLEM CAME UP FOR ONLY BRIEF DISCUSSION. BRITISH VIEW WAS THAT ACCOMMODATION FOR PNES WOULD INVOLVE VERY STRINGENT VERIFICATION PROCEDURES AND IN VIEW OF NON-PROLIFERATION AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS THEY STRONGLY PREFERRED THAT PNES BE BANNED. BRITISH ALSO THOUGHT THAT CTB DISCUSSIONS MIGHT HAVE EFFECT OF DRIVING SOVIETS INTO TAKING A POSITION ON PNE (I.E., IN FAVOR OF PNE ACCOMMODATION) WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO JEOPARDIZE PROSPECTS FOR A CTB. THEY THOUGHT WEIGHT OF WORLD OPINION WOULD BE AGAINST THE SOVIETS IF THIS PROVED TO BE THE CASE. BRITISH THOUGHT THAT PNE ACCOMMODATION UNDER A CTB WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT NONPROLIFERATION INTERESTS AND WOULD GIVE SOVIETS OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN SIGNIFICANT MILITARY INFORMATION IN THE COURSE OF THEIR PNE PROGRAM. WE SAID THAT SECRETARY VANCE MIGHT BE ABLE TO FIND OUT HOW MUCH GIVE THERE WAS IN THE SOVIET PNE POSITION DURING HIS MOSCOW VISIT.

9. DURING THE DISCUSSIONS WE EMPHASIZED THE HIGH LEVEL OF

USG INTEREST IN PURSUING A CTB AGREEMENT, BUT AT THE SAME
TIME MADE CLEAR THAT WE HAD NOT YET REACHED THE DECISION
STAGE ON MAJOR ISSUES.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: CTB, DISARMAMENT, ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, NEGOTIATIONS, NUCLEAR TESTS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 18-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
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Drafter: CFLOWERREE
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Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
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